Volume 37

Issue 4

Article 16

June 1931

Judge and Jury
Leo Carlin
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Leo Carlin, Judge and Jury, 37 W. Va. L. Rev. (1931).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss4/16

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Carlin: Judge and Jury

BOOK REVIEWS
JUDGE AND

JuRY.

By Leon Green.

Kansas City: Vernon

Law Book Co. 1930. Pp. vi, 417.
This little volume is a collection of essays and addresses, most
of which have already appeared separately in various legal publications within the last few years. Following are the chapter
titles: Structure of Tort Classification; Analysis of Tort Cases;
The Duty Problem; The Negligence Issue; Rules of Causation;
Mahoney v. Beatman: A Study in Proximate Cause; The Palsgraf
Case; Law and Fact; Deceit; Assault and Battery; Malicious
Prosecution; A New Development in Jury Trial; Jury Trial and
the Appellate Courts; Why Trial by Jury?
The title of the volume, which might seem rather foreign to
the purport of the specific topics, derives significance from the
fact that all the topics focus more or less upon a general theme
which threads the entire discourse. This theme may perhaps adequately be described by the borrowed phrase, "the law in action",
or dynamics of the judicial process; for if there is anything which
the author undertakes to demonstrate, it is that there is nothing
static about the law, that there is no law without action, and that
the judicial process is inevitably dynamic. In the judicial process, the major problems are concerned with the respective functions of judge and jury. Hence the title. As the chapter titles
will indicate, the author has largely confined his inquiries to the
field of tort, as the one most prolific for purposes of demonstration. A more pretentious title might have been, "The Judicial
Process as Exemplified in Tort Actions".
The necessary lack of homogeneity in the volume as a whole
makes it impracticable to attempt a review that would do justice
to the many interesting and enlightening phases of thought in the
specific topics. Comment will be confined mainly to the general
theme.
The author's attitude toward the judicial process may be
described briefly as "modern". The "law" of the case is settled by the judgment of the court. The judge and the jury each
perform functions prerequisite to the judgment. The task of the
judge is to employ a technique for the purpose, in the first instance, of determining whether, or to what extent, the jury shall
participate in deciding the case; and in the second instance, for
passing the case to the jury for its decision. This function of the
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judge, in traditional and conventional terms, is usually defined as
"deciding the law of the case". For such purpose, the judge has
been supposed to have recourse to what are variously described
as legal rules, principles, precepts or theories. But the author
undertakes to demonstrate that the judicial process cannot be
adequately explained or justified on any theory of a priori application of rigid rules or principles. Legal precepts are useful aids
as methods of approach, thought vehicles and stimulants and
mediums of articulation. As such, they help to carry forward the
judicial process and to articulate the judgment, but they cannot
dictate the judgment. The judicial process is larger and more
complicated than these mere mechanisms which serve it. But
obviously the judicial consciousness must have some background
other than the bare facts on which to function.
If not rules,
principles or precepts, then what ?
It will be necessary to seek for something broader and more
flexible than formal rules, principles and precepts, and for a term
which will adequately include that breadth and flexibility. The
term selected is "factor". The "factors which control judgment"
are the following: "(1) The administrative factor, (2) the moral
factor, (3) the economic factor, (4) the preventive factor, (5) the
justice or 'capacity to bear loss' factor." In order to clear the
tort field of the overwhelming complexity of inadequate and perplexing conventional legal rules and give these "factors" an opportunity to operate intelligently, the following formula is prescribed for the analysis of tort cases: (1) The right-duty problem;
(2) the violation of duty problem; (3) the causal relation problem; (4) the damage problem. The bulk of the volume is concerned with a subjection of these analyses to the test of concrete
cases, coupled with a demonstration of the futility of relying upon
the orthodox historical methods of approach.
It might be mistakenly surmised that the author is urging
abandonment of the use of legal rules in the judicial process.
Such is not so. He merely calls attention to the limitations of
their use. In fact, he demonstrates that he can make rather neat
use of them himself (and this seemingly in the orthodox, conventional manner), when he is keen on the scent of a false decision.
What we should escape from is any canonizing or apotheosis of
words and principles which leads to what is described as a "legal
theology". In truth, the very salvation of the judicial process is
secured by the fact that these rules and principles are so numerous,
varied, indefinite, contradictory and alternative in application
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that they leave the field open for operation of the judicial factors
enumerated above. He comes very near to injecting a fourth
dimension into the judicial process. "The 'law' of to-day is not
the same as it was yesterday nor what it will be to-morrow." The
whole doctrine of stare decisis is thrown overboard. No case decided can be the absolute law for any future case, because each
case has its own setup, its peculiar personal equations, and these
are a part of the law. Yet if there is a fourth dimension, the
judiciary are nevertheless permitted to go their Euclidian way.
Such is the variety of judicial measuring rods of the conventional
sort that an astute judge is rarely in danger of having his technique unduly cramped.
The three concluding chapters rather stand off by themselves.
The first of the three is an enlightening review and comparison of
legislation designed for the purpose of substituting a modified
form of the special verdict for general verdicts, as a device for
dispensing with instructions to the jury and thus obviating the
most fruitful source of trial error. The second traces the recent
ascendency of appellate courts, calling attention to the inadequacy
and cumbersomeness of their methods of review, and explaining
their inevitable tendency to add to the emphasis of formal legal
theories and principles as controls of the judicial process. The
last chapter, first published in TE AmERICAN MERCURY, is a
merciless and unqualified condemnation of the trial jury. All
that is said in this respect may be conceded as true. But some
things that might be said in mitigation are left unsaid. This the
author admits in a footnote reference to the prior chapter, where
it is admitted that the jury may serve some useful functions in the
judicial process, particularly as a "shock absorber" to shield the
judiciary from an accumulation of animosity, and to dispose of
problems which are not amenable to the artistry of the more refined end of the judicial process. One cannot help wondering
whether this last chapter received a tinge from consciousness of
the fact that it was to be published in THE AmERICAN MERCURY.
One may be tempted to inquire, conceding that all that the
author undertakes to demonstrate as to the proper workings of the
judicial process is true, what is to be done about it- The author
would perhaps say, "Nothing". Whether there is a "law" which
is made dynamic through the application of principles, "factors",
personalities, or what not; whether there is actually a "law"
which grows, or whether there is merely a judicial technique
which varies with social fluctuation; it will perhaps, in any event,
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be conceded that the whole thing, whatever it is, is too large and
has too much momentum to be swerved very much from its course
by any process of retrospective analysis. Yet it is believed that,
differ with the author as we may as to some of his generalizations,
no one can read this volume without conceding the force of many
of his conclusions. Particularly, his methods of analysis help to
disclose the inadequacy of many of the orthodox methods of approach to legal problems, and, to this exent, at the least, should
help to clarify the application of accepted, conventional standards
of solution.
The author's style is entertaining. The repetition is a little
tiresome, but we are warned in the foreword to expect this, owing
to the fact that the book is what may be described as an "assembled" volume.
-LEo

THE BVIVA.

OF NATURAL LAW CONCFXTS.

CARLN.

By Charles Grove

Haines. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1930. Pp. xiii,
388.
The subtitle of this volume indicates its most significant content, "A Study of Limits on Legislature With Special Referenc
to the Development of Certain Phases of American Constitutional
Law", to the thoughtful student of the Constitution of the United
States this work is particularly welcome. Over a period of little
more than a century there has been erected an elaborate structure
of fundamental law for the protection of private rights against
legislative action. Many students have turned their attention to
the application of this body of law by the courts of the nation,
but few have sought either to examine the sources of judicial
doctrine from which the law emanates, or to define the nature of
the guaranties thus accomplished. Dean Pound, more perhaps
than any other scholar, has indicated the presence and influence
of higher law doctrines in American law, particularly the force
of Puritan thought, but it has remained for Professor Haines to
subject to painstaking study and thorough analysis the process
by which the presence of this ingredient came about. A considerable share of the material in the volume has previously appeared
in a series of law review articles by the author, particularly those
in the Texas Law Review on judicial review and implied limitations on legislative action. The concentration of this material,
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